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Abstracts:
The Contentious Complexities of Ineluctability of the Iranian
Revolution
Touraj Atabaki
Forty years following the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, the narratives of the revolution and
its discourse are still very dominant, not only among Iranian elites inside the country, but also
in the everyday life of non-elites, when people recall and cry out the revolution’s mottos either
in paradoxical or cynical forms. In people’s recollections of the revolution, there is often a
reference to the ‘golden period of prosperity’ prior to the revolution. By revisiting the rapid,
albeit uneven economic and social development which Iran experienced during the last 15
years of Pahlavi rule (1962-1977), this paper intends to reflect on the question of the
inevitability or the degree to which the Iranian Revolution could have been averted through
the interaction between state and society, with reference to both economy and culture.

Revolutions and Women’s Rights: The Iranian Revolution in
Comparative Perspective
Valentine M. Moghadam
The Iranian Revolution of 1979, and in particular the process of Islamisation that followed,
has been much debated. An especially large literature has grown with respect to the impact
on Iranian women’s legal status and social positions. Studies agree that the immediate
outcome was a drastic decline in women’s participation and rights, especially when
compared with achievements in the years before the revolution. There is less consensus on
the nature of the developments and changes that have occurred since the first decade of the
Islamic revolution and on the salience of class. In addition, more research is needed on how
Iran fares in ‘women’s empowerment’ measures compared with (a) the historical record on
revolution and women’s rights, (b) countries that experienced revolutionary change at
roughly the same time as Iran (e.g. Portugal, Afghanistan, Nicaragua), and (c) Muslimmajority countries at similar levels of socio-economic development (e.g. Turkey, Tunisia).
This paper will address these three under-researched arenas and thus examine the gendered
legacy of the Iranian Revolution from a historical-comparative perspective.

Iranian Left, Radical Change, and the National Question
Kamran Matin
Four decades after the 1979 revolution, Iran is simmering with popular discontent. The
conjunction of thirty years of illiberal neo-liberalisation, catastrophic corruption, the Islamic
Republic’s loss of legitimacy, the crisis of reformism, and the US economic sanctions are
wearing most Iranians’ patience thin. In a sense, Iran is approaching a revolutionary crisis.
Under these circumstances what should a radical left political strategy look like? This paper
addresses this question by focusing on the problematique of agency. Theoretically, it draws
on Trotsky and Gramsci. Empirically, it invokes the 1979 revolution as well as more recent
developments within the Kurdish democratic movement in Turkey and Syria to argue that a
successful leftist political strategy ought to avoid class-reductionism and foreground social
justice, radical democracy, gender equality and plural nationhood. Only such a strategy will
be able to engage and mobilise subaltern classes, women and nationalities in particular, as
the social backbone of a radical democratic hegemonic project.
1
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Introduction
Sevgi Adak

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is widely seen as one of the most significant events of the
twentieth century. This is so not only because of its dramatic consequences for the political,
social and cultural landscape of Iran and the Middle East, but also because of the way it
shuffled the dynamics in international politics and the world economy on a global scale. As a
world historical event, it continues to cast a shadow on the contemporary developments and
debates in the Middle East region and beyond, and inform political and theoretical questions
regarding social change. In fact, one of the major impacts of the Iranian Revolution was felt
in the academic debates on the causes and trajectories of social revolutions, shedding new
light on the relationship between the role of ideology, state capacity, social mobilisation,
international context and historically salient social structures.
The three articles that are compiled together in this first paper of the Abdou Filali-Ansary
Occasional Paper Series are the short versions of the papers presented at a panel discussion
held at the Aga Khan University Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations on 23 May,
2019. Marking the 40th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution, the aim of the panel
discussion was to revisit the debate on the causes and impact of the revolution for Iran and
beyond, from various angles, employing the conceptual and theoretical tools of different
disciplines. Three questions, in particular, guided the interdisciplinary dialogue and political
reflections on this world historical event: How should we analyse the conditions
underpinning the revolutionary dynamics in Iran in the global context of the 1970s? How
should the Iranian Revolution be analysed in an historical-comparative perspective? And,
what is the legacy, or rather, the multiple legacies, of the revolution for the political struggles
in Iran and the Middle East today?
By engaging with these rather broad questions through their own lenses and areas of
expertise, the authors reflect on one specific aspect while reconsidering some of the most
salient issues stemming from the political and scholarly debate on the Iranian Revolution
forty years on, namely the question of inevitability, the consequences of the revolution for
women and the national question in Iran. Touraj Atabaki’s article focuses on the last 15 years
of the Pahlavi regime and addresses the question of whether the Iranian Revolution could
have been averted. By putting the relationship between the state and the society at the centre
of his analysis, Atabaki analyses the rapidly shifting dynamics of Iran’s social, political and
economic development in this period and comes to the conclusion that the revolution could
have been avoided by the shah, at least in two instances. Valentine M. Moghadam’s article
provides a fresh look at the question of how the revolution affected Iranian women in terms
of women’s empowerment indicators. Analysing Iran in comparison to countries that
experienced revolutionary change at about the same time as Iran and other Middle Eastern
countries with comparable socio-economic development levels, Moghadam underlines the
impact of Islamisation in the Iranian case and points to state policies as the main obstacles
to women’s rights and political participation. Finally, Kamran Matin focuses on the current
crises the Islamic Republic of Iran faces 40 years after the Iranian Revolution and explores
the components of a successful left strategy for political change. Having analysed the main
positions of the Iranian left and the way in which they have been historically engaged with
classical Marxist theory, Matin suggests that the success of a leftist strategy for political
change in Iran depends on a critical reflection on this theory and a fundamental shift in the
approach to the national question in Iran.
2
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The Contentious Complexities of Ineluctability
of The Iranian Revolution
Touraj Atabaki

Erik Hobsbawm has called the Russian Revolution ‘the central event of the twentieth
century’, with ‘its practical impact on the world far more profound and global than that of the
French Revolution.’ Regarding the Iranian Revolution, Hobsbawm identified it as ‘one of the
central social revolutions of the twentieth century.’ The twentieth century certainly witnessed
other key social revolutions, such as the Chinese and Cuban Revolutions, which according to
Hobsbawm fall into the same category as the Russian Revolution, at least in terms of their
global impact. But how about the Iranian Revolution? Are there any common features
between the Russian and Iranian Revolutions in terms of their goals, ideological
organisations, or long-term outcomes. In my reading, if one compares and contrasts the two
revolutions as they happened, there are some conspicuous similarities:
A- Both were caused by the uneven social and economic development of the Tsarist and
Pahlavi monarchies alongside the agency of authoritarian modernisation, where there
was modernisation without modernity. Tsar Nikolai Alexandrovich Romanov and
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi both asserted that they needed to be acknowledged as
major player in world politics.
B- Both revolutions were unpredictable. Two months prior to the February Revolution of
1917, Lenin stated in an address to Bolshevik youth supporters who visited him in
Zurich that although they might live to see the proletarian revolution in Russia, he, at
the age of 46, could not expect to live long enough to do so.
Almost one year prior to the Shah’s departure from Iran, American President Jimmy Carter
proclaimed that under the ‘great leadership of his majesty the king,’ Iran had become ‘an
island of stability’ in one of the most troubled regions of the world.
C- For both revolutions, external pressure mattered. For the Russian Revolution the
catalyst was the First World War, while for the Iranian Revolution it was US Democrat
President Jimmy Carter’s liberalisation policy and the withdrawal of US backing for
Iran’s monarchy.
D- Both revolutions were internationalist in tone. Their immediate impacts could be
traced beyond their national frontiers.
E- And finally, both revolutions aimed for a totalitarian regime, intending, though
unsuccessfully, to give birth to a new man: Sovietsky Chelovek in the Soviet Union,
and Ensan-e momen va movahhed-e taraz-e din1 in Iran. However, both ended up
creating Mafiosi Sans Frontières.
On the question of the historical inevitability of the two revolutions, one could come up with
a series of ‘what ifs.’ Regarding the Russian Revolution, Tony Brenton asks: ‘Could things
have gone differently? Were there moments when a single decision taken another way, a

1
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random accident, a shot going straight instead of crooked … could have altered the whole
course of Russian, and so European, and world history?’ (Brenton 2016: 2)
How about the inevitability of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79? In my opinion, a top-down
question could by its very nature be nostalgically irritating if one were to ask What could
have been done at the top to avoid the revolution at the bottom. The alternative
bottom-up question would be teleologically alleviating: To what extent was Iran ready
for the radical change?
Although these two questions seem different, in my judgment they are very much
intermingled. Revolution or any social episode is only avertible when it happens. Forty years
after the Iranian Revolution, the common frameworks used to contextualise the revolution
are:
1- Conspiratorial-imperialist
modernisation, or

interventions

ending

the

age

of

authoritarian

2- Verbal discourse, or Shi’i theology and clericalism jumping on the back of the
westoxification of Third-Worldism, calling for the return to oneself. Michel Foucault
prefers to call this the return of political spirituality.
In my reaction to the question of inevitability or avertability of the Iranian Revolution, while
avoiding the essentialist approach of naming a singular reason for the revolution, I opt to
ground my approach in political sociology and revisit the revolution by examining the
interaction between state and society with reference to both economy and culture. In other
words, I would like to emphasise the state’s deficiency in creating even development and the
societal reaction to the prevailing uneven development. The period I adopt for my study of
this interaction is the long fifteen years prior to the revolution, i.e. 1962-1977. During these
fifteen years, Iran went through rapid, albeit uneven economic and social development,
juxtaposed with a move from milder forms of autocratic governance to a more repressive
kind of political dictatorship. Even though at the beginning of this period, the degree of
political exclusion for both right and left of the political opposition differed, by the end of the
period, almost all sides of the political spectrum were subject to insistent repression.
This period was inaugurated by the introduction of the Third Five Year Development Plan of
1962-67. Indeed, the plan was the road map and backbone of what the Shah later called the
White Revolution. In May 1961, after eight years of wide-ranging repression which overrode
every corner of the political sphere in Iran, a rally was organised by the followers of
Mosaddeq in northern Tehran, calling for an end to political exclusion and repression. Three
months later, in August 1961, the Shah held his own rally in eastern Tehran where he
announced the introduction of a series of widespread economic reforms which he intended
to implement.2 A year and a half later, in January 1963, a referendum was held initiated by
the Shah’s reform programme; a series of far-reaching socioeconomic plans which he opted
to call the White Revolution. Although there was great confusion among the various political

The program of widespread economic reforms that the Shah promised was in fact the brain child of
Hassan Arsanjani. Arsanjani was a longstanding advocate for land reforms and also a renowned
expert in agriculture who had prepared this plan at the request of the Prime Minister, Ali Amini. See:
Afkhami, G. (1999) Ideology, Process and Politics in Iran’s Development Planning. An Interview
with Manouchehr Gudarzi, Khodadad Farmanfarmain and Abdol-Majid Majidi, Washington:
Foundation for Iranian Studies, pp. 167-170. Amini, I. (2009) Zendegi Siyasi Ali Amini (Political Life
of Ali Amini), Tehran: Nashr Mahi, p. 171 and 385. Afkhami, G. (2001) Ideology, Process and Politics
in Iran’s Development Planning. An Interview with Alinaghi Alikhani, Washington: Foundation for
Iranian Studies, 2001, p. 37.
2
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parties and organisations about how to react to these governmental reforms, one could
nevertheless see that for the opposition it was almost impossible not to endorse the Shah’s
reforms. The protest motto of the students of Tehran University at that time was perhaps the
best marker of this perplexity: ‘Yes to the reforms, No to the dictatorship.’
Returning to the question of the inevitability of the revolution. My argument is that 1962 was
the best year in which the Shah could have avoided the revolution, if he had been able to
keep a balance between economic and political development. I do not support the
conventional argument that the Shah’s government lost its credibility and legitimacy
following the 1953 coup, never being able to regain it. The world has witnessed abundant
examples of far more brutal political regimes than that of the Shah in 1962 which retreated
in favour of national reconciliation. The Shah missed this option however.
Following the implementation of the Third Five Year Development Plan and the White
Revolution, Iran went through a period of rapid economic growth, thanks to the colossal
increase of oil revenue from 29 billion Rials in 1963 to 182 billion Rials in 1972. This increase
of more than 500% in oil revenue enabled an 8.8% growth in national GDP. Within this, the
average annual growth-share of the industrial and mining sectors was 7.7% (Gozaresh
‘Amalkard Barnameh ‘Omrani Sevvom 1341-1346, 1968).
In this period, the migration of the work force from rural to urban areas resulted in a
decrease of the labour force in the agricultural sector and an increase in the workforce in
urban industries. Hundreds of thousands of villagers surged towards the cities. Employment
in the new large industries was amongst the final destinations of this migration which grew
by 4.2% to more than 2 million people (Gozaresh ‘Amalkard Barnameh ‘Omrani Sevvom
1341-1346, 1968).
Along with the increase of the workforce in the large industries came a perceptible
improvement in the living and working conditions of this workforce. The average 25%
annual increase of salaries in some sectors even reached 200-400%. In addition to this, the
provision of health care and free housing needs to be mentioned.
A strong female presence in all professions including an increase in the number of female
workers, widespread literacy programs, increased higher education opportunities, improved
healthcare and communication networks among others, were the direct outcomes of such a
development state. The population mobility resulting from these reforms led to the increased
rights of citizens whom the Shah, borrowing from leftist vocabulary, referred to as ‘freeliberated men’ and ‘free-liberated women.’
On the other hand, the large-scale rural migration to big cities resulted in the excessive,
uncontrolled and unhealthy growth of slum settlements; another indicator of uneven
development. In fifteen years, the population of Iran increased from 23 million in 1961 to 34
million in 1976, while the urban population doubled from 8 million to 16 million (Gozaresh-e
Moqaddamati-e Sarshomari-e Nofous va Maskan, 1976) comprising 48% of the total
population in 1976. The biggest growth occurred in Tehran with an increase from 2.7 million
to 4.5 million in a decade (1966-1976) (Kazemi 1980: 3). Due to the high rate of migration,
the big cities could not fully meet the demands of the newcomers. Reaching a pinnacle in the
mid-1970s, slum dwellers, while residents within the boundaries of the urban conurbations,
did not contribute to the urban economy. Estimates placed the total number of slum dwellers
between 500,000 and one million (Abrahamian 2008: 139). In 1976, slum dwellers made up
11% of the total population of Isfahan and 10% of the population of Kermanshah.
(Mohandsin-e Moshaver-e Tarh va M’emari, Tarh-e Tavandmansazi va Saman Dehi-e
Sokonatgahay-e Qeyr-e Rasmi-e Shar-e Esfahan. Gozaresh-e Marhaleh-e Aval. Shenasayie Mahalat-e Qeyr-e Rasmi, 2006; Khatam 2002: 33-4). The growth of the number of these
5
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urban slum dwellers soon proved that this group could potentially have a strong impact on
any political change.
The uneven development, as such, could not have caused drastic consequences on its own,
including political and economic instability. The government policy of injecting new-found
wealth into the economy through increasing public expenditure led to a widening gap
between demand and supply. Higher incomes and subsidised prices increased consumption
by 12% which led to a sharp increase in inflation by 18% annually. On the whole, the
economic crisis undermined what the Shah’s government had achieved a decade earlier. The
gradual signs of unrest among the labouring poor (not industrial workers) was an indication
that the government’s apparatuses were unable to control the subordinated classes.3
As far as the middle classes were concerned, the demand was more political. Although the
middle classes benefitted from the economic growth which occurred together with notable
economic and social development, nevertheless, the exclusive and coercive political practices
prevailed as before. While in the social sphere changes in the urban/rural relationship
became more conspicuous, the political space still suffered from the post-1953 coup
repression.
Thus, the 15-year period which started with the inauguration of the Third Five Year
Development Plan in 1962, paved the way for the foundation and consolidation of a new
developmental state and the rapid economic growth which resulted in the deepening
economic crisis of 1977. Therefore, in contrast to the common and predominant paradigms
of revolutions, the Iranian Revolution was the outcome of more than a decade of rapid
economic growth followed by a short period of economic stagnation or decline (Davis 1962:
1-19).
Returning to the question of the inevitability of the revolution, my conclusion is that it would
have been possible to avert it. If in August 1977 the Shah had decided to replace his longterm Prime Minster Hoveyda with a figure such as Shahpour Bakhtiyar or Dr Gholamhossein
Sadighi instead of with economist Jamshid Amouzgar in order to control the economic crisis,
he could have done so.
The Shah lost his chance of averting the revolution for a second time. What happened after
August 1977 was nothing short of an aggregation of perplexities. The revolution was getting
under the skin of the big cities, although it had been predicted and prepared for by many.
*****
How was the Russian Revolution of 1917 remembered in the Soviet Union forty years later in
1957 when all the founders of the revolution were dead or executed? Was there any question
about the inevitability of the 1917 Revolution amongst the common people and non-party
elites in 1957? No valid documents or narratives exist to answer this question. In contrast,
some forty years following the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, narratives of the revolution
and its discourse are still very dominant in Iran, not only among Iranian elites inside the
country, but also in everyday life, when people recall and cry out the revolution’s mottos
either in paradoxical or cynical forms.

For a comprehensive study of the economic and political crisis leading to the 1979 Iranian the
Revolution see: Bashiriyeh, H. (1984) The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962–1982, New York: St.
Martin's Press.
3
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Revolutions and Women’s Rights: The Iranian
Revolution in Comparative Perspective1
Valentine M. Moghadam

The nature of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and especially the process of Islamisation that
followed, has been the subject of much scholarly discussion and debate. A large literature has
grown on the revolution’s impact on Iranian women’s legal status and social positions.
Studies agree that the immediate outcome was a drastic decline in women’s participation
and rights, especially when compared with what had been achieved in the years before the
revolution. There is less agreement on the nature of the developments and changes that
have occurred since the first decade of the Islamic revolution and on the salience of class.
Four decades after the Iranian Revolution, it is worth taking stock of how the revolution
affected Iranian women’s legal status and social positions at a time when other countries also
experienced revolutionary changes, and where they are today.
In the longer paper, I examine how Iran fares in “women’s empowerment” measures
compared with (1) the historical record on revolution and women’s rights, (2) countries that
experienced revolutionary change at roughly the same time as Iran did: Portugal (1974),
Afghanistan (1978), Nicaragua (1978-79), and (3) MENA countries today at similar levels of
socio-economic development: Algeria, Turkey, Tunisia. For the latter, sources of data include
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the World Economic Forum’s Global
Gender Gap Report, and the UNDP’s Human Development Report.
To summarise my argument: The Islamisation process that followed the Iranian revolution
seriously undermined women’s roles, especially when compared with outcomes in Portugal,
Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. Since then, Iranian women have made notable advances in
educational attainment and health, and their resistance to social restrictions is widespread,
but they remain burdened by structural and institutional constraints and an inability to
organise and mobilise – burdens that do not exist in most of the comparator countries. The
main contradiction seems to be that the massive gains in education have not been
accompanied by gains in employment and political participation, and here the comparison
with Tunisia and its 2011 political revolution is especially illuminating. This reality indicates
that the main hindrances to women’s participation and rights lie not at the level of family
and individual decision-making and norms, but rather at the level of state policy.
Iran, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Portugal: Explaining Differences
I begin the paper by drawing on my previous research on gendered revolutions and their
outcomes (Moghadam 1997, 1999, 2003, 2013), where I develop a model of two types of
gendered revolutions: the patriarchal and the emancipatory. What determines each type of
revolution and its gender outcomes? Domestically, the chief determinant appears to be the
ideology of the revolutionary movement (and/or its dominant forces) and of the new state.
Social structure is also salient, in that a given population (or a large or prominent segment of
it) should be sufficiently prepared for the intended social transformation and to help realise
This paper is a summary of a longer paper prepared for the panel 40 Years On: Reflections on the
Iranian Revolution, held at the Aga Khan University Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations,
London, 23 May 2019.
1
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it. In terms of ideology, Iran’s Islamist movement was in a category of its own, whereas
Portugal, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua were guided by a socialist ideology. In terms of social
structure, Portugal was arguably the most developed of the four countries compared in this
section, and Afghanistan the least developed.
In general, where revolutionaries or the leadership of the democratic transition are guided
by a modernising and socialist ideology and left parties are influential, and especially where
women and their organisations have had a strong presence (itself dependent on the country’s
social structure), the outcome is more likely to be emancipatory in gender terms. Where
those conditions are not present, and especially where revolutions or political movements
have been guided predominantly by religious or nationalist ideology, patriarchal outcomes
are more likely to occur. Despite temporary disruptions in the course of the revolution as
women take part in protests and struggles, pre-existing patriarchal gender relations are often
carried over in the post-revolutionary situation. This is less likely to happen, however, when
a “critical mass” of women has entered the public sphere in the pre-revolutionary situation,
and when large numbers of women take part in the revolution and assume decision-making
and leadership roles. Thus, structural determinants of gendered revolutionary outcomes and
transitions seem to be: (1) the pre-existing social structure and the nature of gender
relations; (2) the movement ideology and goals; and (3) the extent of women's participation
in the movement and leadership.
In Iran, the principal determinant of the gendered revolutionary outcome was the ideology of
the revolutionaries. Although left-wing organisations and movements were part of the antiShah revolutionary coalition and in the early days of the post-revolutionary period appeared
popular and influential, the Islamic revolutionaries were the dominant force and went on to
build an Islamic state. Theirs was a religious and cultural-nationalist ideology that called for
the re-establishment of the traditional Muslim family, soon codifying a “patriarchal gender
contract” premised upon the male breadwinner and female homemaker ideal. Although
Iranian women had taken part in the massive street demonstrations of 1978 and early 1979,
their slogans had been those of the broader revolutionary coalition, and not those that might
be more typical of women's interests (e.g. equality of women and men, women's autonomy
and self-determination, full political and social citizenship rights, etc.) – at least not until
March 1979, when they were too weak to challenge the Islamists. Most importantly, women
were nowhere in the revolutionary coalition’s leadership, which was dominated by clerics
(exclusively men), male nationalist leaders and male leftists.2
In the immediate post-revolutionary period, the National Union of Women was formed – but
this occurred in the absence of a mass social movement of women. The novelty of feminism
as an ideology, the novelty of autonomous women's organising and, perhaps most
significantly, the absence of a sizable female working class precluded any real influence on
the politics and positions of the Left’s organisations, let alone the Islamists. In contrast,
women had been working in Portugal since the 1960s, and in Nicaragua, many women
worked in the rural sectors. But the principal difference between the Iranian revolution and
the revolutions in Portugal, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua lay in the ideology of the
revolutionary leadership and the new state.
All four revolutions experienced trajectories that were quite different from each other as well
as, to some degree, different from the initial agenda and immediate outcome. The data
shows, however, that decades after the revolutions Iran still lags behind Portugal and even
low-income Nicaragua on several important gender indicators, particularly those pertaining
to women’s political representation and leadership. On educational indicators, Iranian
2 Ashraf

Dehghani, head of the splinter group Fedayee Guerrillas, was the exception.
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women do very well, but overall Iran is ranked very low on the Gender Inequality Index,
given also the large number of legal and policy restrictions on women’s mobility and rights.
We now turn our attention to how Iranian women fare in relation to several MENA countries
at similar stages of socio-economic development: Algeria, Turkey, and Tunisia. On measures
such as secondary school and tertiary enrollments, and health, Iran does very well. On
labour force participation and political representation, however, it remains behind its
comparators. Iranian women are far behind their counterparts in Algeria and Tunisia on
important measures such as women’s political representation and leadership and
involvement in professions such as university teaching staff and judges.
Finally, we return to the subject of revolution and compare Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution
with Tunisia’s 2011 democratic revolution. This also helps explain why Tunisia’s gender
indicators are so much better than those of Iran (see also Moghadam 2019). Both Iran and
Tunisia are Muslim-majority countries located in the Middle East and North Africa region,
and both experienced revolutionary upheavals that were nationwide, cross-class, and nonviolent. Here the common features end, for Iran’s 1979 revolution and Tunisia’s 2011
revolution had very different outcomes, especially for women’s participation and rights. I
make several arguments:
 Iran’s was the first social revolution that broke with the past only to result in an Islamic
Republic; in contrast, Tunisia had a more limited political revolution that retained
previous institutions, values, and norms to embark on a peaceful and procedural
democratic transition, with its republican model intact.
 Temporality is important; women’s rights have become institutionalised in world
society and indeed in the world polity, through the numerous treaties that have been
signed and diffused by IOs, INGOs, and of course the UN. This was the case by the time
Tunisia had its revolution but was not so in the late 1970s, when Iran had its revolution.
Related to this point is that women’s legal status and social positions, and their
experience with modernisation, were more limited in Iran in 1979 than was the case in
Tunisia in 2011.
 The Iranian left and the secular forces were not in an advantageous position in 1979,
compared with Tunisia in 2011; civil society and political party development in each
case was profoundly different, with implications for the dominant ideology of the
revolutionary movement and afterwards. Although in neither Iran nor Tunisia did
leftists form a sustained united front, in Tunisia leftists and secularists did form such
fronts on at least two occasions, which helped to check the progress of the Islamists.
Alliances between the left, secularists, and feminists in Tunisia prevented backsliding
on women’s rights and in fact enabled new gains for women’s participation and rights.
Significant explanatory factors also include discursive and ideological changes over 30-35
years in the feminist and left movements, with both embracing democracy as well as
secularism. Neither democracy nor secularism nor feminism was an established norm in
Iran in the late 1970s. Forty years on, the Islamic Republic remains in place and the political
elite staunchly opposed to change.
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The Iranian Left, Radical Change, and the National
Question
Kamran Matin

Four decades after the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is beset with a
manifold crisis: a socio-economic crisis of nearly thirty years of illiberal neo-liberalisation, a
legitimacy crisis due to deepening social inequality and systematic governmental corruption,
and a foreign policy crisis resulting from Iran’s regional interventions and the effective
demise of the nuclear deal and crippling US sanctions. With the political bankruptcy of the
regime-embedded reformists, streets have increasingly become the main site for the
expression of popular grievances and political discontent. Indeed, in late 2017, early 2018
Iran experienced a winter of discontent as large numbers of people in numerous cities and
towns across the country took to the streets and demonstrated against poverty,
unemployment and corruption. There has also been a general strike in Kurdistan and several
high-profile labour strikes and workers’ sit-ins over the past year or so followed by waves of
police repression. All in all, Iran is arguably approaching, if not experiencing, a general
crisis.
Under these circumstances what should a left political strategy look like?
The answer to this question is not straightforward largely because there is no unified Iranian
left. However, for the purpose of the present argument two main tendencies could be
distinguished: the ‘anti-imperialist left’ and the ‘economist left’.
The ‘anti-imperialist left’ intellectually and politically draws on the legacy of the Stalinist
Tudeh party. For this tendency IRI’s apparent anti-imperialism over-determines its broader
political strategy towards IRI. This has, for example, led Iran’s anti-imperialist leftists to
support IRI’s intervention in Syria in support of Bashar Assad’s brutal regime, and oppose
the Kurdish national movement, even in neighbouring countries, as an imperialist plot to
partition Iran. The ‘economist left’, which admittedly is not an ideal description, refers to the
new left and radical Marxist groups and tendencies that have a strategic focus on anticapitalist struggle within Iran to the relative neglect of national and gender questions. For
this camp, it is the exigencies of fighting the national bourgeoisie that over-determines its
broader political strategy. In other words, in political terms the anti-imperialist left is
‘externalist’ while the economist left is ‘internalist’. Given IRI’s severe suppression of dissent,
neither camp exists in an organised manner inside Iran but mostly as discursive fields in the
public sphere and social media.
What both of these left tendencies share is a basic assumption that the working class is the
main socio-historical agency for a radical progressive political transformation in Iran. And
relatedly, both tendencies tend to view the national question of so-called ‘minorities’ as a
distraction from anti-imperialist and class struggles. This perspective on agency and
subaltern national movements in turn rests on a broader theory of capitalist development
that is uncritically adopted from classical Marxism. In contrast, I suggest that the
articulation of a successful political strategy by the radical Iranian left depends on a critical
reflection on this theoretical framework. In what follows I sketch this argument focusing on
the national question and how it can be a central element to a successful leftist political
strategy in Iran.
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The Marxist left’s assumption that the working class forms the decisive revolutionary agency
in the capitalist epoch is derived from Marx’s theory of capitalist development. Marx
assumed capitalism would progressively divide society into two major classes: proletariat,
and the bourgeoisie. For Marx, the proletariat was a ‘universal class’ with ‘radical chains’ and
therefore its emancipation amounted to the emancipation of the whole of society. It was
therefore the leading historical agency and central to a socialist transformation in capitalist
modernity. This view was based on Marx’s study of England as the home of the first
systematic development of capitalism. It was rendered universally valid through Marx’s
conception of capitalism’s expansion as an essentially transnational process. Marx saw this
process unfolding in a temporally differentiated fashion generating essentially similar
outcomes in different countries. Interestingly, this stance was in tension with Marx’s own
empirical observations of capitalist development in backward European countries and the
colonial and non-European world (cf. Anderson 2010). Late in life, Marx (1977: 572) issued a
stern warning against turning his ‘sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into
a historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread …’.
Nevertheless, Marx’s belated concerns did not bear on the basic theoretical framework of
historical materialism, which subsequent Marxists applied to their local and national
contexts.
It is therefore unsurprising that Marxism has been vulnerable to the charges of Eurocentrism
and historical unilinearism. The intellectual roots of these problems however lie deeper in
the basic assumptions of Marx’s general social theory, namely, historical materialism. More
specifically it can be traced to historical materialism’s basic premise of the ‘double
relationship’ formulated in The German Ideology, i.e. the claim that ‘the production of life …
appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as natural, on the other as a social
relationship’ (Marx and Engels 1970: 50; 1993: 87). Marxist social theory therefore elides the
intrinsic multiplicity of the social world and hence the whole plane of inter-societal relations.
Indeed, Marx’s monumental Capital involves an explicit abstraction from international
relations (Marx 1990: 727). Consequently, key theoretical concepts of Marxism, including
that of revolutionary agency, are necessarily formed by reference to the internal dynamics of
a particular society, i.e. England, and then generalised as universal. Marxist ideas of ‘uneven
development’ and ‘imperialism’ implicitly addressed the consequences of this fateful neglect
of societal multiplicity. However, both ideas were derived from the internal logic of the
capitalist mode of production and therefore reproduced the deep theoretical neglect of
societal multiplicity and its consequences of ‘difference, coexistence, interaction,
combination, and dialectical change (Rosenberg 2016: 135–141).
Among classical Marxist thinkers Leon Trotsky was arguably alone in implicitly but directly
addressing the theoretical omission of societal multiplicity in Marxist social theory through
his idea of ‘uneven and combined development’ (UCD). ‘Unevenness’ represents and
foregrounds the ontological condition of societal multiplicity, and ‘combination’ captures its
consequences leading to a conception of ‘development’ as intrinsically interactive and
multilinear. In other words, ‘external’ and ‘internal’ are mutually constitutive and
dialectically reshape each other precluding unilinear social change. UCD’s recognition and
comprehension of societal multiplicity and therefore inter-societal relations entails a
dynamic conception of historical agency that is not derived solely from the dialectic of capital
and labour. A particularly illuminating site of this argument is the phenomena of the nation
and nationalism whose theorisation has been correctly described as ‘Marxism’s great
historical failure’ (Nairn 1975: 3). I have shown elsewhere (Matin 2019) that rather than
being an ideological by-product of capitalism or a form of false consciousness – as Marxists
have tended to assume – the nation and nationalism are in fact constitutive of historical
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capitalism. I will sketch this argument before briefly commenting on its crucial implications
for the political strategy of the Iranian left amidst the current crisis in Iran.
The nation is an abstract community whose historical specificity lies in its political form of
capitalist sovereignty. But it has a double-life. It first emerged in England (later Britain) as a
re-enchanting response to the disenchantment of imperial capitalism. However, the uneven
and combined nature of this process precluded its modular replication elsewhere through
reversing the key moments of its original formation. Within late-comer societies, that is,
later than Great Britain, nationalism forges the nation before capitalism, which geopolitically
over-determines the process from without.
Thus, in non-capitalist societies which directly or indirectly experienced the pressure of
capitalist Britain, nationalism, rather than capitalism, forged the nation as the politicalideological unification of still socially concrete individuals; a process for which the violent
construction of a ‘national’ identity from a particular ethnicity or language was the most
possible, and hence most common, route (cf. Dirlik 2002: 436). In multi-cultural and multiethnic contexts (that is, most of the world) this by default meant the formation of
subalternised ‘minorities’ which, unless granted substantive autonomy, launched their own
mimetic autonomist or irredentist nationalist projects against emerging unitary nationstates (cf. Hobsbawm 1977: 16-17).
This process is precisely what happened in Iran, Turkey, Iraq and most other so-called ‘latecomer’ countries. In Iran, Persian language and culture came to form the ideological core
and consciousness of the modern state and its unitary conception of national identity. This
involved the subordination of the pre-existing political-cultural configurations of nonPersian peoples and their ruling elites, which hitherto had high levels of autonomy in a
decentralised, semi-confederal system. This pre-national polity had no territorial definition
as was the case with all pre-capitalist polities which were essentially dynastic and tribal in
structure. The project of defensive state-formation which the Iranian ruling classes
embarked upon under colonial and imperial pressure from European powers therefore
involved the construction of a culturally defined political hierarchy, i.e. the modern Iranian
nation state. In this new polity the nation and its interests were defined in terms of only one
of the several cultures, languages and religions that existed within its geography, i.e. Persian
(Twelver) Shi’ism. It was this Shi’i-Persian state that led Iran’s subsequent industrialisation
and capitalist development. As a result, and from the start, the capitalist socio-economic
hierarchy contained an inbuilt ethno-cultural hierarchy that co-determined its dynamics and
consequences as well as the terms and forms of resistance to it. Thus, class divisions were
embedded in a complex cultural-political field giving rise to a pattern of regional inequality
and uneven development that to a considerable extent coincided with the distribution of
non-Persian ethnolinguistic communities. These communities therefore turned into
subaltern ‘minorities’ due to their politically and culturally subordinate status within the new
unitary nation-state. The often-cited centre-periphery inequality in Iran only partially reflect
this condition.
Under such circumstances, class formation and class divisions involved a level of ethnocultural definition that makes any hegemonic political project that centres on class struggle
alone highly limited in its popular appeal and political efficacy. For example, the 2009 ‘green
movement’ failed largely, or at least partly, because its strategic focus on liberal-democratic
demands neglected the question of national minorities as well as class and gender. Few cities
outside Tehran participated in the protest movement beyond its early stages. The main cities
in Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Khuzestan and Baluchistan largely remained bystanders during
Iran’s 2009 summer of protests since the movement failed to effectively engage their
culturally sharpened political sensibility. Conversely, the recent labour strikes failed to spark
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any wider political movement and protests. The reason was that their leaders, but especially
some sections of leftist activists and intellectuals outside these strike actions, tended to deny
any link between the workers’ demands and broader political demands, particularly the
question of the oppression of national minorities. To be sure, more severe state repression
might have been a reason for this stance. However, one can also detect a deeper intellectual
reason for this avoidance of the national question.
At the core of this failure, as I have been trying to argue, lies a conception of agency that is
monadic and that does not correspond to the developmental specificities of modern Iran and
the nature of its social and political contradictions. The remarkable success of the Peoples’
Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey further supports this argument. HDP entered the 2015
general elections in Turkey with a radical progressive agenda that was multi-focal in nature
and hence rich in its hegemonic potentials. It appealed to the working classes, subaltern
national and religious minorities and marginalised groups including LGBTQ groups, and
crucially, women. In effect, HDP re-embedded the Kurds’ longstanding struggle for cultural
and political self-institution in a wider radical political programme that foregrounded social,
economic, ethnic, religious and gender inequalities. This enabled HDP to attract large
numbers of voters outside its Kurdish heartland. Indeed, the strategy was an instant success
and despite the Turkish government’s relentless subsequent suppression, HDP retained its
status as the third largest party in the parliament in the last general election. Furthermore, it
played a decisive role in the defeat of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in recent
municipal elections.
A more radical version of HDP’s project in Turkey is the project of ‘democratic
confederalism’ in Syrian Kurdistan better known as Rojava. Democratic confederalism is a
dynamic process of state-deformation in which popular and communal councils
systematically hollow out existing state structures, replacing their hierarchical and
patriarchal relations of authority with horizontal, gender-egalitarian relations of selfadministration based on a use-value oriented and environmentally sensitive cooperative
economy. The project places national, class, gender and environmental questions at its
political and strategic core. As a result, the conception of radical agency is by default plural
and horizontal. The speed with which the project became a mass-movement with remarkable
degrees of success under most unfavourable (geo-)political and economic circumstances is
testimony to the efficacy of the movement and its approach to transformative agency. In
addition, the ferocious violence and deep enmity with which the Turkish state and other
reactionary forces in the region have assaulted this experience is a measure of the historical
threat it poses to the status quo in the region.
To be sure, circumstances in Iran are rather different than in Turkey and Rojava. To start
with, there is no constitutional democracy, party politics, or fair elections in Iran comparable
to those of Turkey’s. Nor is Iran experiencing a breakdown of central state authority due to
war as was the case in Syria. Nevertheless, there is huge political energy and dynamism in
Iranian society today for which the natural political and discursive channel is the radical left.
And yet, the single-track nature of the left’s political and ideological discourse prevents it
from strategically engaging and absorbing this political energy and dynamism, which has
multiple sources irreducible to the contradiction between capital and labour alone.
A new left that seeks to have real impact on Iran at a time when the country is beset by a
general crisis and craving for change must reframe its political strategy through a sustained
and critical reflection on its intellectual foundations. Due to the effects of Iran’s experience of
uneven and combined development, class struggle has no inherent priority over the struggle
of oppressed national minorities, marginalised groups and women. Any political strategy
that focuses on only one of these aspects or organises their significance hierarchically is

15

16
unlikely to attract the subaltern masses and effectuate radical, progressive change in Iran.
Given the ethno-linguistic demography of Iran and the degree to which relations of political
and economic subordination are openly charged with Persian-cum-Iranian nationalism, the
explicit integration and advocacy of equal status, rights and recognition of Iran’s subaltern
nationalities is indispensable to an effective and successful left political strategy in Iran.
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